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Christine  M. Korsgaard 
THREE  KINDS  OF VALUE THEORY 
In  this  paper  I  discuss  what  I  will  call  a  "rationalist" account  of  the 
goodness  of  ends.  I begin  by contrasting  the  rationalist account  to two 
others,  "subjectivism' and  "objectivism.' Subjectivism identifies good  ends 
with or by reference  to some  psychological  state. It includes  the various 
forms  of  hedonism  as well as theories  according  to which  what is good 
is any  object  of  interest  or desire.  Objectivism  may be  represented  by 
the  theory  of  G. E. Moore.  According  to Moore,  to say that something 
is  good  as an  end  is to  attribute  a property,  intrinsic  goodness,  to  it. 
Intrinsic  goodness  is an objective,  nonrelational  property  of the object, 
a value a thing has independently of anyone's desires, interests, or pleasures. 
The  attraction  of  subjectivist  views  is  that  they  acknowledge  the 
connection  of the good  to human  interests and desires.  Most things  that 
are good  are good  because  of the  interest  human  beings  have in them, 
an interest  that can be explained  in terms of the  physiological  and psy- 
chological  constitutions  of  human  beings  and  the  other  conditions  of 
human  life.  In  Kantian  language,  we  may  say that just  as  means  are 
"conditioned" goods  because  their value  depends  on  the  ends  to which 
they  are means,  most  of  our  ends  are conditioned  goods  because  their 
value depends  on the conditions  of human  existence,  and the needs  and 
desires  to  which  those  conditions  give  rise.  Objectivism  reverses  this 
relation  between  goodness  and  human  interest.  Instead  of  saying  that 
what we are interested  in is therefore  good,  the objectivist says that the 
goodness  is in the object, and we ought  therefore  to be interested  in it. 
This  divorce  of  goodness  from  natural  interest  can  make  it seem  too 
accidental  that we are able to care about the things  that are intrinsically 
good. 
The  advantage  of objectivism is that it explains  certain of our beliefs 
about the  good  that a subjectivist account  cannot  readily accommodate. 
We believe  that  people  sometimes  fail to care  about  what  is good  and 
sometimes  have interests  in or desires  for things  that are not  good.  Yet 
in  subjectivist  theories  it seems  as if  anything  one  enjoys  or  desires  is 
* In  writing  this  paper  I have  benefited  from  the  comments  of  Richard  Kraut and 
Holly  Smith. 
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good  at least ceteris  paribus, and anything  one  does  not enjoy or desire 
is not. A theory of intrinsic values allows us to make sense of beliefs  such 
as that something  may be good  as an end even  though  a person  gets no 
pleasure  from  it, or that a malicious  pleasure  may be intrinsically bad. 
The  rationalist theory  may be seen  as an attempt  to combine  these 
advantages.  According  to this view, an object or state of affairs is good 
if there is a sufficient practical reason for realizing it or bringing  it about. 
The  prima facie reason for it will be, as in subjectivist accounts,  a reason 
springing  from our nature,  conditions,  needs,  and desires.  The  account 
must then provide a test for the sufficiency of this reason. Since not every 
such  reason  will turn  out  to  be  a sufficient  one,  not  every  interest  or 
pleasure will establish the goodness  of its object. The beliefs that motivate 
objectivism  can  be  explained,  but  in  a  different  way.  The  objectivist 
accounts for our failures of appropriate attachment to the good by cutting 
the  tie  between  natural  interest  and  the  good  in  the  first  place.  The 
rationalist accounts for these failures by appeal to the imperfect rationality 
of human  beings.  We sometimes  fail to be motivated  by reasons  that are 
available  to  us  and  so  do  not  want  what  is  good.  We  sometimes  are 
motivated  by insufficient  reasons  and so want what is not  good. 
For the  rationalist  view what is required  is some  sort of  test of  the 
sufficiency  of the reasons  for the adoption  of an end.  It is important  to 
emphasize  that  the  three  theories  are being  compared  with  respect  to 
their assessments of single goods, or it will be hard to see what distinguishes 
the rationalist view. The  subjectivist may of course say that a given  pleas- 
ure-say,  a malicious  one-should  not be brought  about because  of the 
pain that it causes to others. And an objectivist may say of some intrinsic 
good  that  it should  not  be  realized  because  there  are better  things  we 
can  do.  In these  cases both  the  subjectivist and  the  objectivist  may say 
that there is not a sufficient reason for the existence  of some prima facie 
good.  One  may think of this as a negative test of sufficiency:  the fact that 
something  is pleasant or desired or intrinsically good is a sufficient reason 
for  it as long  as there  is no  extrinsic  reason  why  not.  By contrast,  the 
rationalist  account  seeks a positive test of sufficiency  and seeks this even 
for conditional  goods taken singly. The  rationalist thinks that if an object 
of pleasure  or desire is only conditionally  good in the first instance,  then 
the  fact  that  it does  not  interfere  with  other  conditional  goods  is not 
sufficient  to make it absolutely  good. 
This  thought  commits  the  rationalist  to an extensive  view of  what 
practical  reasoning  consists  in.  Both  the  objectivist  theory  of  intrinsic 
value  and  the  subjectivist  theories  are characteristically  associated  with 
an empiricist view about the scope of practical reasoning: that it is primarily 
concerned  with the means to preestablished  ends.'  Ends are marked out 
1.  Some  intuitionists  may view the intuitions  used to ascertain the good  as "rational." 
But no procedures  are envisioned,  and there is nothing  distinctively  practical about these 
intuitions-they  do not even  motivate.  So I am not counting  this as a more  extensive  use 
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for us by something  other than reasoning-our  interests or their intrinsic 
value.  If these  ends  are regarded  as commensurable  and  the  goal  is to 
maximize  the  good,  practical reasoning  is all instrumental  in  form.  If 
they  are  not  commensurable,  there  will  be  another  use  for  practical 
reasoning  in  combining  and  harmonizing  various  ends  into  the  best 
compossible  set. The  rationalist  is committed  to a more  extensive  view 
of the scope of practical reason since the test of the sufficiency of reasons 
will be a way of rationally assessing ends. An end provides thejustification 
of the  means;  the  means  are good  if the end  is good.  If the end  is only 
conditionally  good,  it in turn  must be justified.  Justification,  like expla- 
nation,  seems to give rise to an indefinite  regress: for any reason offered, 
we can always ask why. If complete justification  of an end is to be possible, 
something  must  bring  this regress  to a stop;  there  must  be  something 
about  which  it  is  impossible  or  unnecessary  to  ask why.  This  will  be 
something  unconditionally  good.  Since what is unconditionally  good will 
serve  as the  condition  of  the  value  of  other  good  things,  it will be  the 
source of value.  Practical reason,  then,  has the noninstrumental  tasks of 
establishing what is unconditionally good and, in light of that, establishing 
whether  particular conditional  goods  stand in the right relation to it and 
so really are fully justified. 
What is unconditionally  good  is like what is intrinsically good  in that 
it is objectively  valuable,  but  there  is an  important  difference.  Moore 
and  other  proponents  of  intrinsic values  have thought  that one  cannot 
argue  for  them;  they  must  be  known  through  intuition.  But  you  can 
argue about what is unconditionally  valuable. The reason that there must 
be  something  that  is unconditionally  valuable  is that  there  must  be  a 
source  of value.  Arguments  about what is unconditionally  valuable  can 
proceed  in  terms  of  questions  about  what  is suitable  to be  a source  of 
value;  only  certain  sorts of values  are able to play this role. 
In  the  rest  of  this  paper  I examine,  or  rather  construct,  such  an 
argument.  So  far,  the  terms  in  which  I  have  sketched  the  rationalist 
account are borrowed from Kant. In the next section, I argue that Aristotle's 
position  on  the  superiority  of the contemplative  over the political life is 
also motivated  by the rationalist conception  of the good.  Contemplation 
is the  best  activity because  it can  play the  role  of  a source  of  value:  it 
justifies  other  things.  The  effect  of  this  way  of  looking  at  Aristotle's 
argument  is to assign  to contemplation  the  same role that Kant assigns 
to the  good  will. In the  third section,  I sketch the arguments  Kant uses 
to establish  that this role  must be played  by a good  will. Finally, in the 
last section,  I take up the question  of why these two philosophers  picked 
such  different  candidates  for  the  source  of  value.  What  makes  this  in- 
teresting  is not  only  the  fact that  they  identify  different  things  as un- 
conditionally  good,  but  that  each  philosopher  comes  close  to  denying 
that the other's candidate could be the source of value. Aristotle's argument 
implies that moral virtue could not be unconditionally  good and so cannot 
be the  source  of value.  Kant says explicitly  that contemplation  cannot. Korsgaard  Theories  of Value  489 
ARISTOTLE:  CONTEMPLATIVE  ACTIVITY  AS THE  SOURCE 
OF VALUE 
In  1.5 of  the Nicomachean  Ethics, Aristotle  observes  that there  are three 
types of life thought  to be happy: the life of enjoyment,  the political life, 
and the  life of contemplation.  The  life of enjoyment  is a hedonistic  life 
focused  on conventional  pleasures. The  political life is the life of a states- 
person.  It may aim at despotic  power, or be lived for the sake of winning 
public honors,  but in its most proper form its aim is the exercise of moral 
virtue  and  political  and  practical wisdom  in the  governing  of  the  state. 
The  contemplative  life, speaking  generally,  is the life of the philosopher 
or student  of nature.  But it is an important  part of Aristotle's argument 
that the  aim of  this life  is a quite  particular activity. Contemplation,  as 
Aristotle  understands  it, is not  research  or inquiry,  but an activity that 
ensues  on  these:  an  activity  that  consists  in  understanding.  We  have 
understanding of something when we have grasped its essence-its  nature, 
function,  characteristic activity, and final purpose  -and  see how its other 
universal  properties  arise from  its essence.  The  best objects of contem- 
plation are God (the final purpose of the world) and the heavens. Aristotle 
also believes  that what God does  is to contemplate  and that since God is 
the best thing, God must contemplate  God. God is the activity of thinking 
on  thinking  and  the  aim  of  the  contemplative  life  is to  engage  in  this 
divine  activity.' 
Aristotle's own definition  of happiness  is that it is an activity of soul 
which follows or implies a rational principle, in accordance with excellence 
(1.7).3 In book  1, Aristotle tests this definition  against some criteria which 
he believes  any account  of happiness  or the good  must meet.  The  good 
must be self-sufficient  and final (1.7), it must consist in activity (1.5), and 
it must  be  pleasant  (1.8).  In book  10, Aristotle  turns  once  more  to the 
three  kinds  of  life,  to  see  which  of  them  are  happy.  He  does  this  by 
testing them against the criteria he used before-self-sufficiency,  finality, 
pleasantness,  and  activity-as  well  as  against  his  own  definition  from 
book  1. The  result  of  this investigation  is that the  contemplative  life  is 
judged  happiest,  mainly  on  the  grounds  that contemplation  is the  only 
activity that is loved  for itself alone  (10.7).  The  political life is judged  to 
2.  Readers  of  the  Nicomachean Ethics often  find  a  difficulty  in  understanding  how 
contemplation  as Aristotle  describes  it can be an activity on  which  to spend  time  and  so 
just  what activity he  has in mind.  Space constraints  prevent  my taking up this issue  here. 
The brief description  I have given is gleaned  from the Posterior  Analytics;  Metaphysics  Lambda 
7 and 9; and Nicomachean  Ethics 6.7 and  10.7. Another  issue I do not address directly here 
is the notorious  one of how single-mindedly  the contemplative  life is lived. However,  since 
I  argue  that  Aristotle  nowhere  implies  that  contemplation  is the  only  end,  my  account 
should  remove some of the reasons for supposing  that Aristotle envisions the contemplative 
person  as devoting  all of his time and resources to contemplation  and regarding  everything 
else  as a means  to it. 
3.  References  to the Nicomachean Ethics are given  in the  text,  with  Bekker  page  and 
column where appropriate. Aristotelis  Opera,  ed. Immanuel  Bekker, Berlin Academy (Berlin, 
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be  happy  "in a secondary  degree"  (10.8)  and  the  life  of  enjoyment  is 
dismissed  on  the  grounds  that relaxation  is "not an end" (10.6).  These 
claims are surprising, for Aristotle has already argued that morally virtuous 
actions are done for their own sake by a virtuous person, and that pleasant 
amusements  are  engaged  in  for  their  own  sake  and  are  ends,  seems 
obvious. 
In the next two sections, I examine the way two of Aristotle's criteria- 
finality and activity-can  be used to establish the unconditional  value of 
contemplation. Aristotle is not denying that either morally virtuous actions 
or amusements  are ends. What he is arguing is rather that contemplation 
is an end  in a special  sense.  It is unconditionally  good  and  serves  as a 
source  of value for these  other  ends. 
Finality 
One  of Aristotle's central arguments  for the contemplative  life rests on 
the claim that happiness  must be a good that is final without qualification 
and that this is true only of contemplation,  not of political activity. The 
argument  depends  on a proper  understanding  of the notion  of finality. 
In book  1, Aristotle  explains  the  notion  this way: 
Since there  are evidently  more than one  end,  and we choose  some 
of  these  (e.g.  wealth,  flutes,  and  in  general  instruments)  for  the 
sake of  something  else,  clearly not all ends  are final ends;  but the 
chief good  is evidently  something  final....  Now we call that which 
is in itself worthy  of  pursuit  more  final than  that which  is worthy 
of  pursuit  for the  sake of  something  else,  and that which  is never 
desirable for the sake of something  else more final than the things 
that are desirable both in themselves  and for the sake of that other 
thing,  and  therefore  we call final without  qualification  that which 
is always desirable in itself and never for the sake of something  else. 
[1.7.1097a,  p.  1 1]4 
The  most natural way to read this passage is this: (1) by ends which 
are chosen  for the sake of something  else Aristotle intends what we would 
call means;  (2) by ends  which  are desirable  both  in themselves  and  for 
the  sake of something  else Aristotle  intends  things  that are both  means 
and ends;  and (3) by what is final without  qualification Aristotle intends 
something  that is an end  but never  a means. 
The difficulty with this reading, however, is that it makes what Aristotle 
says absurd.  Why  should  something  be  more  valuable  (and  more  final 
clearly does  mean  more  valuable  to Aristotle) just  because  it is useless? 
It is instructive  to compare  the  passage  in the Republic where  a similar 
threefold  classification  is made.  In which  of  these  classes do  you  place 
justice?  asks Glaucon.  And  Socrates  replies,  "It belongs  in  the  fairest 
4.  Passages quoted  are from  the  translation of the Nicomachean  Ethics by W. D. Ross, 
revised byJ. L. Ackrill andJ.  0.  Urmson,  World's Classics ed. (Oxford,  1980). Page numbers 
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class, that which  a man  who  is to be happy  must  love  both  for its own 
sake and  for the results."5 This  seems  more  like what we should  expect 
once the threefold  classification is made-that  the middle class is "fairest." 
Aristotle  points  out  that happiness  is valuable  in the way of  things 
final without  qualification,  since "for this we choose  always for itself and 
never  for the sake of something  else, but honour,  pleasure,  reason,  and 
every  virtue  we  choose  indeed  for  themselves  (for  if  nothing  resulted 
from  them  we  should  still choose  each  of  them),  but  we  choose  them 
also  for  the  sake of  happiness,  judging  that through  them  we  shall be 
happy" (1.7.1097a-b,  p.  12). Soon  after, Aristotle asserts that happiness 
must be self-sufficient  in the  sense  that it cannot  be increased  by other 
goods. These  remarks together have motivated some to take an "inclusive- 
end"6 view of what Aristotle means by final without qualification.  If hap- 
piness  is a higher-order  end,  a coherent  and efficient  plan for realizing 
one's other  ends,  both remarks are explained.  It cannot  be increased  by 
other  goods  because  it by definition  includes  all that can be compossibly 
realized. And the threefold  classification is now understood  to be means, 
ends,  and the  higher-order  inclusive  end.  Items  in the middle  category 
are both ends and means in the sense that they are valued both for their 
own  sake and as constituents  of the higher  order end.  On this reading, 
Aristotle thinks that ends are justified by membership in a best compossible 
set. 
The  difficulty with this way of reading  the threefold  classification is 
that in book  10 Aristotle puts the classification to work on the three kinds 
of  life  in  a way that seems  to fit the  simple  reading  (means,  ends  plus 
means, ends only) better than the inclusive-end reading. For contemplative 
activity, which  is clearly not an inclusive  end,  is ranked above "practical 
activities" because  they are also useful:  "This activity alone  would  seem 
to be  loved  for  its own  sake; for  nothing  arises from  it apart from  the 
contemplating,  while from practical activities we gain more or less apart 
from  the action" (10.7.1177b,  p. 264).  Thus  we seem  caught  between  a 
reading  of the threefold  classification which makes Aristotle wrong-  the 
uselessness  of contemplation  is not a good  reason  for identifying  it with 
happiness-and  a reading  which  makes  sense  of  the  idea  that  what  is 
final  without  qualification  is  best  but  which  does  not  fit  the  use  that 
Aristotle  makes of the threefold  classification in book  10. 
If  we  suppose  that  Aristotle  is giving  a rationalist  account  of  the 
good, his three categories are means, conditional ends, and unconditional 
5.  Plato, The Republic, trans. Paul Shorey  in The Collected  Dialogues of Plato, ed.  Edith 
Hamilton  and  Huntington  Cairns  (Princeton,  N.J.:  Princeton  University  Press,  1961),  p. 
605. 
6.  The  term is borrowed from W. F. R. Hardie's "The Final Good in Aristotle's Ethics," 
Philosophy  40  (1965):  277-95;  reprinted in Aristotle:  A Collection  of Critical  Essays,  ed. J. M. E. 
Moravscik (Notre  Dame,  Ind.:  University of Notre  Dame  Press,  1968).  Hardie argues that 
Aristotle  confuses  a "dominant end" conception  of  the  good  which  treats contemplation 
as the only end  with an "inclusive end" conception.  This  view of Aristotle is the one  I am 
opposing. 492  Ethics  April 1986 
ends.  Conditional  ends, for Aristotle, are ends valued for their own sake, 
given  that  we  are  human  beings  living  in  human  conditions -among 
friends,  in the city, with a nature both animal and rational to cope  with. 
They  "befit our human  estate" (10.8.1178a,  p. 266).  The  unconditional 
end  plays  a different  role:  it is what  makes  it worth  it to be  a human 
being  and  to live in  human  conditions.  Although  I will argue  that the 
passages  about  ends  in  the Nicomachean Ethics are consistent  with  this 
reading,  nothing  in  that  work  so  decisively  favors  it as these  remarks 
from Eudemian Ethics 1.5: 
After all, many things  that happen  are such as to induce  people  to 
abandon  life-disease,  extremes  of  pain,  storms,  for  example;  so 
that it is evident that on account of those  things at any rate, it would, given 
the choice, have been worth choosing not to be born in the  first place.... 
In general,  if we put together  all the things  that everyone  does  or 
undergoes,  but not voluntarily (because they are not done or under- 
gone  for their own sake), . . . no one would choose  in order  to have them 
to be alive, rather than not. Nor  again would  anyone  who  was not  a 
complete  slave prefer to live solely for the pleasure  associated with 
nutrition  and sex.... 
They  say  that  Anaxagoras,  when  someone  raised just  these 
puzzles  and  asked him what it was  for which a person would choose  to 
be  born  rather  than  not, answered that it would be in order to apprehend 
the heavens  and the order  in the whole  universe.7 
In this passage it is quite clear that whatever is to play the role of happiness 
must be something  that makes human  life worthy of choice. 
If we suppose  that Aristotle distinguishes  between  the unconditional 
ends  for  which  we  would  choose  life  and  conditional  ends  which  we 
choose  given  that we are alive but for which  we would  not choose  life, 
I believe  we can arrive at a more  natural reading  of the puzzling  things 
Aristotle  says about  ends  whenever  he  discusses  the  three  lives.  It will 
be the  mark of  a conditional  end  that it is also a means.  But this "also" 
is not  merely  conjunctive;  rather,  its being  a "means" or constituent  of 
a worthwhile  life  will be what makes  it possible  to choose  it as an end. 
The  fact that something  plays a certain instrumental  or constitutive  role 
in  human  life  makes  it  worthy  of  choice.  Its  instrumentality  may  be 
regarded  as essential  to what it is; this is true of artifacts which are made 
for  certain  purposes  and  for  activities  understood  as instances  of,  say, 
"recreation" or  "exercise." When  something  which  is essentially  an  in- 
strumental  or  a constitutive  activity  is  also  interesting  or  beautiful  or 
pleasant  it may be chosen  as an end  under  the condition  of its utility. 
I believe  that this is how Aristotle regards amusements  and conven- 
tional  pleasures.  When  he is dismissing  the life of amusements  in  10.6, 
Aristotle  says: 
7.  Aristotle's  Eudemian  Ethics, 12 15b-12  16a, trans. Michael Woods, Clarendon  Aristotle 
Series  (Oxford:  Clarendon  Press,  1982),  pp.  5-6.  Emphases  mine. Korsgaard  Theories  of Value  493 
Happiness,  therefore,  does not lie in amusement;  it would, indeed, 
be strange if the end were amusement,  and one were to take trouble 
and suffer  hardship  all one's life in order to amuse  oneself.  For, in 
a word, everything that we choose we choose for the sake of something 
else-except  happiness,  which is an end.  Now to exert oneself  and 
work  for  the  sake of  amusement  seems  silly and  utterly  childish. 
But  to amuse  oneself  in order  that one  may exert  oneself,  as An- 
acharsis puts it, seems right; for amusement  is a sort of relaxation, 
and we need  relaxation  because  we cannot  work continuously.  Re- 
laxation,  then,  is not an end;  for it is taken for the sake of activity. 
[10.6.11176b,  p. 262] 
We cannot  plausibly  think  that Aristotle  is declaring  amusement  to be 
a mere  means.  It is absurd to suppose  that if you read detective  stories 
in the evening  in order to relax, you do it in the same instrumental  spirit 
in which you go to the dentist  for repairs on your teeth.  Given that you 
are a human  being,  and  so cannot  work continuously,  and  are capable 
of taking pleasure in reading detective stories, you do it for its own sake 
that is, for the  pleasure  of it. But you would  not choose  to be a human 
being  or  "to take trouble  and  suffer  hardship  all your  life" in order  to 
read detective  stories. Amusements  have  a place in human  life because 
human beings need relaxation.  But that place is not the center; the happy 
person  does  not  live for them.8 
Now  something  like this point  can also be made  about the  political 
life, but this requires  some  care. For the  political life is not,  like the life 
of  amusements,  a mistake.  Virtuous  actions  are  done  by  the  virtuous 
person  for their own sake. The  political life fits Aristotle's definition  and 
meets the criteria for a happy life. But while the political life can be final 
for the individual,  in a sense it cannot be final for the city. What Aristotle 
says about  pleasant  amusements  for  the  individual  can  be  said  about 
virtuous  actions for the city: that they play a necessary role, but that role 
cannot  be the center. 
And  happiness  is thought  to  depend  on  leisure;  for  we  are busy 
that we may have leisure,  and make war that we may live in peace. 
Now  the  activity of  the  practical virtues  is exhibited  in political  or 
8.  Anything pleasant can be an end, and the person who chooses the life of amusements, 
although  she is making  a mistake, is not making  the same sort of mistake that the person 
who  chooses  the  life  of  money-making  is.  Money  is a mere  means,  so  the  person  who 
makes an end  of it has really inverted  the values of things.  (It is a mark of our agreement 
with Aristotle  that we do  not  imagine  the  money-making  life  as really lived  for  the  sake 
of  money.  We imagine  money  as playing  the  same  role  in  this life  that  honor  does  in  a 
common  version  of  the  political  life:  it is a sort of  external  sign  of one's  entrepreneurial 
virtue.)  The  person  who  chooses  amusements  is not  mistaking  a means  for an end:  he is 
mistaking  a conditional  end  for an unconditional  one.  Aristotle  suggests  that he does  not 
know  anything  better  (10.6.1177b).  Or,  perhaps,  if  he  is  reflective,  he  has  denied  the 
existence  of  unconditional  goods  and  therefore  placed  all  goods  and  all pleasures  on  a 
level. This  is why it is conventional  to defend  the life of amusements  by reflections  on the 
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military  affairs,  but  the  actions  concerned  with  these  seem  to  be 
unleisurely.  Warlike actions are completely  so (for no one  chooses 
to be at war, or provokes  war, for the sake of being  at war; anyone 
would  seem  absolutely  murderous  if he  were  to make enemies  of 
his  friends  in order  to bring  about  battle  and  slaughter);  but  the 
action  of the  statesman  also is unleisurely,  and aims-beyond  the 
political action itself-at  despotic power and honours, or at all events 
happiness,  for  him  and  his fellow  citizens-a  happiness  different 
from  political  action,  and  evidently  sought  as  being  different. 
[10.7.1177b,  pp.  264-65] 
Political activity aims at setting up a context  in which people  can be 
happy. The  statesperson  makes laws and establishes conditions  in which 
the  citizens  can  have  a good  life:  a life  that will not  consist  of  making 
laws and establishing  conditions  but, rather, of something  else. And this 
something  else  will therefore  be  a more  final good,  for it will be what 
gives political activity its point.  If we take a broader interpretation  of the 
political life and include in it other forms of community  service, the point 
still holds.  The  doctor  cures  people  so  that  they  may  have  the  health 
that makes a good  life possible.  Imagine  that the only good  life is the life 
of a doctor. Then  if the doctor were successful and everyone were healthy, 
there  would  be no  point  to life.  In general,  morally virtuous  activity of 
the sort characteristic of a political life aims at the establishment  of con- 
ditions  for a good  life  and therefore  cannot  itself be the  only  good  life 
or the  most  final. 
It is clear that Aristotle thinks that the exercise  of the moral virtues 
in a morally  motivated  project  can be the  final good  of  an individual's 
life. One can center one's life around, say,justice in fighting for oppressed 
people  or courage  in a military life or political and practical wisdom  in 
making laws for the city. For an individual such an activity is a final good, 
for  the  virtuous  person  does  these  things  for  their  own  sake.  But  this 
sort of life of the moral virtues is conditional  in a particular way, namely, 
on  something's being  wrong or imperfect.  Engaging  in politics is choice- 
worthy  because  there  are  injustices to  put  right,  and  being  a  soldier is 
choiceworthy because  there are wars to be  fought,  and being  a doctor is 
choiceworthy because illness is a recurrent flaw in human  life and so  on. 
But  it would  be  better if life did  not  have these  limitations and  defects. 
Imagine  that it doesn't: some  Solon  has made  laws that deliver us from 
poverty, injustice, and  inequality; medical science has taught us all to be 
healthy through  simple daily dietary and exercise routines, and so forth. 
What in these  idyllic conditions  will make life worth choosing? A certain 
amount  of business must be done  in order to provide goods  and services 
for the citizens, but these must befor something. And we may imagine that 
the people  have a lot of leisure. What will they do with it? Will they now 
devote themselves to conventional amusements? These  have already been 
dismissed  as insufficient  to  make  life worth living. Will morally virtuous 
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everyday way. They  will need  everyday justice to keep their promises and 
contracts and to return services. They will need the social graces of wit and 
friendliness in their dealings with one another. They will need temperance. 
But being just,  friendly, and temperate  in these ways cannot be the final 
goods or central activities of human  life. Certainly, one  would not choose 
a human life or choose to be a human being in order to keep one's promises 
and to exercise temperance. Even if one does do these things for their own 
sake, they are not final goods. 
The  value  of  the  political life is conditioned  by the  limitations  and 
defects  of human  life, just  as the value of amusements  is conditioned  by 
the  need  for  relaxation.  Just  as you  would  not  choose  to be  a human 
being  in order  to do  something  that only  makes  sense  because  human 
beings  need  relaxation,  so you  could  not  choose  to be  a human  being 
merely  in order  to overcome  the  defects  and limitations  of  human  life. 
Aristotle therefore  looks for an activity that would make life worth living 
even  if life  had  no  defects  and  limitations  to overcome-and  so which 
makes them  worth overcoming.  This  activity will be one  whose  value  is 
unconditional.  The  mark of  this will be  that we  do  not  gain  anything 
apart from  doing  it. 
It is to secure this unconditional character for happiness that Aristotle 
raises the  question  of  how  the  gods  spend  their time.  For the  gods  live 
a life  that has no limitations  and defects  to overcome,  and so the value 
of their activity cannot  be in that way conditioned: 
We assume the gods to be above all other beings blessed and happy; 
but what  sort of  actions  must  we  assign  to  them?  Acts of justice? 
Will not  the  gods  seem  absurd if they  make  contracts  and  return 
deposits,  and so on? Acts of a brave man, then, confronting  dangers 
and running  risks because  it is noble  to do so? Or liberal acts? To 
whom  will they  give?  It will be  strange  if they  are really  to  have 
money  or anything  of  the  kind. And  what would  their  temperate 
acts be? Is not such praise tasteless, since they have no bad appetites? 
If we  were  to  run  through  them  all, the  circumstances  of  action 
would be found trivial and unworthy of gods. Still everyone supposes 
that they live and therefore  that they are active; we cannot suppose 
them  to sleep  like Endymion.  Now  if you  take away from  a living 
being action, and still more production, what is left but contemplation? 
[10.8.1178b,  pp.  267-68] 
Without  needs,  fears,  or bad appetites,  a god  could  not  make  a life  of 
overcoming  limitations.  What  a  god  does  must  be  something  that  is 
valuable just  for  the  doing  of  it.  If being  human  makes  it possible  to 
engage  in  such  an  activity,  then  there  is  a  reason  for  being  human: 
something  that  makes  life  worthy  of  choice.  It is such  an  activity that 
Aristotle  identifies  as happiness  and  as the  source  of  the  value  of  the 
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Activity 
The  distinction between conditional and unconditional ends as it functions 
in Aristotle can be illuminated  by a distinction  borrowed  from Aristotle's 
metaphysics:  that of process  (kinesis)  versus activity (energeia).9  A process 
gets something  done  or effects a change,  and it has a natural termination 
point:  when  the  thing  is  done  or  the  change  effected.  An  action  (as 
opposed  to an activity) is a kind of process.  An activity is a doing  for its 
own sake. It is not (qua activity) an attempt to get anything  done because 
it  is  its  own  end.  Aristotle  gives  us  various  criteria  for  distinguishing 
activities and  processes.  An  activity, Aristotle  says, is complete  at every 
moment,  so  that  we  can  apply  to  it  the  following  criterion:  at  every 
moment  one Xs and has Xd. A process can be done  quickly or slowly; in 
a sense, an activity cannot. A process is done for the sake of its termination, 
for the  sake of what one  gets done;  and  an activity is done  for its own 
sake. An example  of a process is building  a house.  This  is an attempt  to 
get  something  done-to  get a house  built.  It has a natural termination 
point-when  the house  is built. It is not complete  at every moment:  one 
cannot  say that at every moment  of building  that one is building  a house 
and  one  has  built  a house,  because  one  cannot  say one  has  built  the 
house  until it is over. One  can build a house  quickly or slowly. One  does 
not build a house  for its own sake; one  does it in order to get the house. 
One of Aristotle's examples  of an activity is seeing:  at every moment  one 
sees and has seen;  one  cannot  see quickly or slowly; it is not an attempt 
to get  something  done,  occupying  a certain space of time and having  a 
definite  termination.  Hence,  seeing  is the  sort  of  thing  that  might  be 
done  for its own  sake. 
Confusion  will be  avoided  if we  keep  in  mind  the  following  facts. 
First, the same physical movements  will often be both process and activity, 
so  that the  difference  is a matter  of  description.  But  this by no  means 
trivializes the  distinction,  for the  difference  in description  will be moti- 
vationally and rationally pertinent.  Take walking. "Walking"  is the name 
of a physical business,  and one  that can be involved  in either  processes 
or activities. Walking-to-the-bank is a process. It has a definite termination- 
arriving at the bank. It has a purpose  outside  of itself: being  at the bank, 
so that I can make a transaction. It can be done quickly or slowly. I cannot 
say  at  every  moment  that  I  am  walking-to-the-bank  and  that  I  have 
walked-to-the-bank:  I can only  say that I have walked-to-the-bank  when 
I  have  arrived.  Compare  this  to  "taking-a-walk." Taking-a-walk  is  an 
9.  Aristotle's  major discussions  of  this distinction  are in Metaphysics  Theta 6 and Ni- 
comachean  Ethics 10.3.  I have  learned  from J.  L. Ackrill's "Aristotle's Distinction  between 
Energeia and Kinesis,"  in New Essays  on Plato and Aristotle,  ed. Renford  Bambrough  (London: 
Routledge  & Kegan  Paul,  1965).  Ackrill's discussion  of  the  case  of  walking  led  to  my 
reflections  on  that  example.  My account  of  the  relations  between  energeia and  kinesis is 
constructive,  however.  My remarks about things  that are both  processes  and activities and 
about processes  that are taken up as activities are not based directly on what Aristotle says. Korsgaard  Theories  of Value  497 
activity. It does not have, in itself, a definite  termination.  I can, of course, 
facilitate  my  walk-taking  by setting  myself  a termination,  but  this  is a 
device.  If when  I get  there  I decide  to  go  further,  I am  still taking-a- 
walk.  On  the  other  hand,  if  I am walking-to-the-bank  and  when  I get 
there,  decide  to go farther,  I am no longer  walking-to-the-bank  but now 
am just  taking-a-walk. It is true at every moment  that I am taking-a-walk 
and  I have  been  taking-a-walk  and  almost  whenever  I stop  I will have 
taken-a-walk.  Furthermore,  I can walk quickly or slowly while  taking-a- 
walk,  but  I cannot  take-a-walk quickly or slowly.  (If  I schedule  a walk 
daily and usually spend  an hour  at it, and today being  pressed  for time 
I only spend  half an hour,  I might say that I took my walk quickly today. 
But  this  is  a  rather  special  circumstance  and  requires  an  explanation 
such as I have given: you would only say that you took your walk quickly 
today  to  someone  who  knew  of  your  usual  schedule.)  Taking-a-walk  is 
not  done  merely  for  the  sake of  the  end  result,  but for its own  sake: it 
is a pleasure.'0 
The  second  thing  to  keep  in  mind  is  that  performing  a  certain 
process can be an activity.  The notion of activity,  energeia,  is closely associated 
with the  notion  of ergon, function.  In one  of its uses, a function  is one's 
work. Thus,  although  building  a house  is itself a kinesis or process,  per- 
forming  this  process  is the  ergon, and  so  the  energeia, of  an  architect. 
House  building  is what she does.  Let us suppose  that she does  not do it 
in a bored  and  grudging  manner  and just  for the  money,  but that she 
loves it, exercises artistic taste and engineering  skill, and derives satisfaction 
from  constructing  a dwelling  perfectly  suited  to her clients' needs.  She 
does  not  do  it just  for the  sake of  the  house  (although  the  house  gives 
the  activity its point),  for as soon  as she finishes  one  she starts another, 
and-this  is an important  mark of  an activity-she  seeks  the  occasions 
(within decent  limitations)  of house  building. 
There  are  several  important  points  to  make  about  this.  First, an 
activity is, ontologically  speaking,  the  only  thing  that is appropriate  to 
play  the  role  of  a final  good. " An  action  or process  is not  because  an 
action or process  is by its nature  the sort of thing  that is for the sake of 
something else, for the sake of the change affected or the product produced. 
If it aims at a product,  the pertinent  question  is what it is good  for. If it 
aims at producing  a state or condition,  the same question  can be raised; 
life  is activity, and  being  healthy  or virtuous  is pointless  if one  is going 
to sleep forever. Thus an activity, done for its own sake, is the appropriate 
10.  Of  course  you  may be  walking  for  the  sake of  exercise  (of which  walking  is an 
instance)  and  exercising  for  the  sake of  health  (to which  walking  is a means).  Taking  a 
walk is a conditional  end: it is both useful  and pleasant. And this is not a mere conjunction: 
the  human  need  for exercise  is what makes it pleasant. 
11.  Here  it matters  that for Aristotle  pleasure  is activity (or so close  to activity that 
the two are indistinguishable),  and unimpeded  activity is pleasure  (7.12-13;  10.4). Though 
pleasure  taken generally  is not the final good,  the final good  will necessarily be a pleasure. 498  Ethics  April 1986 
sort of  thing  to be a final good,  and to play the role of what ultimately 
justifies  other  things.'2 
As the case of the architect shows, however,  this does not mean that 
something  which is in itself a process cannot be an individual's  final good. 
One can make a certain process one's activity. And this is in a sense what 
Aristotle  envisions  for the political life.  For moral actions are in a sense 
processes: they have an aim outside themselves, and their occasions should 
not be created, though  the political person  seeks them.  As long  as there 
is occasion  for them,  however,  they can be the activity of someone's  life, 
just  as architecture  can,  as long  as there  is a need  for houses.  But just 
as the architect's life and activity are only possible as long  as someone 
not necessarily the architect herself-needs  and will enjoy the house,  so 
the statesperson's  life and activity are only possible as long as someone 
the citizens-enjoy  the benefits in the form of a different sort of happiness. 
And  in  general,  for any activity that is also a process  there  will be  this 
dependence:  the  possibility  of  its  being  an  activity will  depend  upon 
someone's  benefiting  from  the results of the  process. 
A  process  that  is also  an  activity is a conditional  end.  Its being  a 
process is what makes it conditional:  it depends  for its value on the value 
of its result or product.  Its being  an activity is what makes it an end.  If 
it calls upon  the  resources  of  one's  talents  and  virtues,  exercises  one's 
faculties, is pleasurable and impeded  only by a (usually inoperative)  factor 
of  limited  occasion  or  opportunity,  then  it  can  be  the  final  good  of 
someone's  life. Of course  most of the things  that human  beings  do with 
themselves  are of this nature. There are not very many "pure"  activities 
activities that are not also processes.  But Aristotle thinks that there must 
be at least one.  For the results of any process (including  the ones  people 
make activities of)  must in turn be justified  by the role that they play in 
some other activity. Everyjustification  must refer eventually to an activity. 
This  means  that ultimately,  if justification  is to be complete,  there  must 
be a pure activity, one that is not also a process. Now this is what Aristotle 
thinks contemplation  is: it is the purest of all activities. For contemplation 
is not research but the exercise  of the understanding;  it does not involve 
change'  or the overcoming  of any limitation; its occasions are inherently 
unlimited.  It  is because  contemplation  is an  activity  that  is not  also  a 
process  that Aristotle  identifies  it as the  most final good.  The  structure 
ofjustification  requires that ultimately all value must be traced to a pure 
activity. Only a pure activity can be unconditionally  good.  Since Aristotle 
thinks  that  contemplation  is the  only  such  activity, he  thinks  that  it is 
the  source  of value. 
12.  I have learned this from Warner Wick's "The Rat and the Squirrel, or the Rewards 
of Virtue," Ethics 82 (1971):  21-32. 
13.  Aristotle  points out that contemplation  is an activity that does  not involve  process 
at the  end  of Nicomachean Ethics 7.14.  (The  phrase  is translated  "activity of  immobility.") 
Divine contemplation  is also the purest activity for ontological  reasons: it is immaterial and 
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KANT:  THE  GOOD  WILL AS THE  SOURCE  OF VALUE 
The  Grundlegung opens  with  the  claim  that the  only  thing  that can be 
found  anywhere  of unconditional  value is a good will. As Kant envisions 
the  structure  of justification,  the  goodness  of  means  is conditioned  by 
the  goodness  of the ends  which  they  serve; the  goodness  of  those  ends 
which  are not morally obligatory  is conditioned  by their contribution  to 
happiness, and the goodness of happiness is conditioned by the possession 
of a good  will, which "seems to constitute  the indispensable  condition  of 
being  even  worthy  of  happiness"  (pp.  393/7). 14  Since  a good  will is the 
only  unconditionally  good  thing,  everything  else  must  ultimately  trace 
its justification  to this: virtues  such  as intelligence  or calmness  must  be 
directed by it, happiness  must be deserved  by it, particular ends must be 
chosen  in accordance  with it. The  good  will is the  source  of value,  and 
without  it, nothing  would  have any real worth. 
As we saw, Aristotle's arguments  that contemplation  is the most final 
good can be construed as being based on the claim that only contemplation 
can serve as a source  of value.  To  confer  value  on other  things,  and so 
to justify  them completely,  the final good  must be something  that makes 
human life worthy of choice and it must be a pure activity. Contemplation 
is the  final good  and  source  of value because  it meets  these  conditions. 
In a similar fashion,  Kant will argue that the good will is unconditionally 
good  because  it is the only  thing  able to be a source  of value.  In order 
to  follow  this argument,  it is necessary  to keep  in mind  that on  Kant's 
view a good  will is a perfectly  rational will. The  argument  is essentially 
that only  human  reason  is in a position  to confer  value  on  the  objects 
of  human  choice. 
The  point is made in both the Grundlegung, in the argument  leading 
to the  Formula of Humanity  and in chapter  2 of the Critique  of Practical 
Reason. In the Grundlegung, Kant begins  from the  fact that, if there  is a 
Categorical  Imperative,  then  there  must be something  of unconditional 
value.  For, if  there  is a Categorical  Imperative,  then  there  are  actions 
dictated by pure reason,  and the ends of these actions will be completely 
justified.  It  must  be  possible  to  formulate  the  moral  law  in  terms  of 
whatever  the  source  of  this justification  is.  Kant argues  that  only  our 
humanity,  or rational nature, can play this role. The objects of inclination 
have  only  a conditioned  value,  he  says, for their worth  depends  on  the 
inclinations  themselves  (the things we desire are good  because  we desire 
them,  not  the  reverse).  The  inclinations,  however,  cannot  confer  value 
on  their  objects,  for  they  are  not  themselves  unconditionally  valuable. 
Kant says that since  they  are sources  of  needs  it would  be better  to be 
rid of them  altogether,  but it is sufficient  for his point  that they are not 
14.  Kant, Groundingfor  the  Metaphysics  of Morals, trans. James Ellington, in Kant's  Ethical 
Philosophy  (Indianapolis:  Hackett Publishing  Co.,  1983). References  will be in the text. The 
first page  number  is the  standard reference  to the  Prussian Academy  edition;  the second 
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a sufficient  condition  for the goodness  of their objects. The  existence  of 
an inclination  is not enough  to make its object good,  for the inclination 
itself  may be bad. Other  things  in nature  are only  means.  But  rational 
nature  is an end  in itself,  for "in this way man  necessarily  thinks of  his 
own existence;  thus far it is a subjective principle  of human  actions.  But 
in this way also does  every other rational being  think of his existence  on 
the  same  rational  ground  that holds  also for me;  [note]  and it is at the 
same  time  an  objective  principle,  from  which,  as a  supreme  practical 
ground,  all laws of the will must be able to be derived" (pp. 429/36).  The 
note  refers  us to the  third  section:  the  argument  is that we  necessarily 
think of our own  existence  as able to confer  value on our ends  because 
we  necessarily  think  of  ourselves  as autonomous  and  so of  our  ends  as 
freely and rationally chosen.  Nothing  else justifies  our ends and actions; 
it is our rational autonomy  itself that does so. The argument  is in a simple 
sense  transcendental:  we regard some of our ends as good,  even  though 
they are obviously conditional; there must be a condition of their goodness, 
a source of their value; we regard them as good whenever  they are chosen 
with full rational autonomy;  so full rational autonomy  itself is the source 
of their value. Since this holds for other rational beings as well as myself, 
I cannot  act against  their rational autonomy  without  violating  my own; 
and so it turns out to be a good  will that is the source  of all value. 
In the Critique  of Practical Reason, Kant claims that good  is a rational 
concept.  This means that if ends are to be good, they must be determined 
by reason, not merely inclination or pleasantness; if ends were determined 
by pleasantness,  only means could be called "good" since only they would 
be determined  by reason  (pp.  62/64). 15  It also means  that "what we call 
good  must  be,  in  the judgment  of  every  reasonable  man,  an object  of 
the  faculty  of  desire" (pp.  60/62-63).  Thus  the  reasons  for  "calling" a 
thing  good  must be universalizable.  The  sufficiency of a reason  is tested 
by  its  universalizability.  Behind  the  assumption  that  if  every  rational 
being  could  acknowledge  something  to  be  good  (the  reason  for  it  is 
universalizable)  then  it is indeed  good  (the reason  for it is sufficient)  is 
the  idea  that it is rational  beings  who  determine  what is good;  rational 
nature  confers  value on the objects of its choices  and is itself the source 
of all value.'6 
In Aristotle, the question  of what the final good is has a metaphysical 
as well as an ethical significance:  contemplation  is the final purpose  not 
only of human  life but also of the world.  Kant makes an argument  that 
is  similar  but  in  a  way  reverses  the  order  in  which  these  points  are 
15.  Kant, Critique  of Practical Reason, trans. Lewis White Beck, Library of Liberal Arts 
(Indianapolis:  Bobbs-Merrill  Co.,  1956).  References  will  be  in  the  text.  The  first  page 
number  refers  to the  Prussian Academy  edition,  the  second  to the  translation. 
16.  These arguments are treated more thoroughly in my "Two Distinctions in Goodness," 
Philosophical Review 92  (1983):  169-95,  and  "Kant's Formula of  Humanity," forthcoming 
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established.  The  final purpose  for human  beings  must also be regarded 
as the final purpose  of the world. Since whatever  is chosen  with a good 
will is good,  we  can construct  the  ideal  of  a totality of  all good  things. 
In  the  Grundlegung, this  is  the  Kingdom  of  Ends:  "A whole  both  of 
rational  beings  as  ends  in  themselves  and  also  of  the  particular  ends 
which  each may set for himself"  (pp. 433/89).  In the Critique  of Practical 
Reason it is the  Highest  Good,  "the unconditioned  totality of  the  object 
of pure practical reason" (pp.  108/112),  virtue and the happiness  merited 
by it for every  rational being.  This  turns out  to be the final purpose  of 
the world as well as the  good  for humanity. 
Theoretical  reason,  like practical reason,  seeks  the  unconditioned: 
it keeps  asking why until explanation  is complete.  Such complete  expla- 
nation  cannot be given in terms of mechanical  laws, for even  if we could 
explain  everything  in  nature  in  terms  of  some  set of  mechanical  laws, 
there  would  be  no  answer  to  the  question  why  the  world  is organized 
according  to  these  laws rather  than  some  other  set.  For unconditional 
explanation  we would  need  a teleological  system of  the world,  in which 
every event and thing could be explained, justified, and fully comprehended 
in  terms  of  some  final  purpose,  to the  realization  of  which  everything 
else would be organized.  This final purpose  would have to be something 
unconditionally  good:  something  for  the  sake  of  which  nature  might 
have been created.  Of course,  according  to Kant we cannot have a meta- 
physical or teleological  system of the world with the status of knowledge. 
We  can  and  should  think  of  the  world  in  this  way,  using  teleological 
concepts  as tools of reflection,  but we can have no knowledge  that there 
is a God who  created  the world  for the  sake of  some  end.  The  rational 
ideal of the full and unconditional explanation of things cannot be realized; 
it is beyond  the  limits  of  our  finitude  and  sensible  nature.  Yet we  can 
say what would realize the speculative  ideal of reason. It would be knowl- 
edge  of  the  world  as a Kingdom  of  Ends:  "Teleology  considers  nature 
as a kingdom  of  ends;  morals regards  a possible  kingdom  of  ends  as a 
kingdom  of nature.  In the first case the kingdom  of ends is a theoretical 
idea  for  explaining  what  exists.  In  the  latter  it is  a practical  idea  for 
bringing about what does not exist but can be made actual by our conduct, 
i.e., what can be actualized in accordance with this very idea" (pp. 436n./ 
42n.). 
The  same  ideal  governs  reason  in  theory  and  practice,  that  of  a 
system of purposes.  Such a system requires a final purpose.  For practical 
reason,  this is the  good  will. In the Critique  of TeleologicalJudgment  Kant 
argues  that this is also the only possible  candidate  for the final purpose 
of a teleological  system of nature.  The  only possible  end  of creation-if 
the  world  were  known  to  be  purposive  creation-would  be  humanity 
under  moral laws. Kant begins by identifying  human  life as the purpose 
of the teleological  organization  of nature.  If nature exists to set the stage 
for  human  life,  then  we  must  seek  the justification  of  nature  in  some 
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Without  men the whole  creation would be mere waste, in vain, and 
without  final purpose.  But it is not in reference  to man's cognitive 
faculty (theoretical  reason)  that the being  of everything  else in the 
world  gets  its  worth;  he  is  not  there  merely  that  there  may  be 
someone  to contemplate  the  world.  For if the  contemplation  of  the 
world  only  afforded  a representation  of  things  without  any  final 
purpose,  no worth could accrue to its being from the mere fact that 
it is known; we must presuppose  for it a final purpose,  in reference 
to which its contemplation itself has worth. Again it is not in reference 
to the feeling  of pleasure  or to the sum of pleasures  that we think 
a final purpose  of creation is given....  It is that worth which [man] 
alone  can give to himself  and which consists in what he does,  how 
and according  to what principles  he acts....  That  is, a good  will is 
that whereby  alone  his being  can  have  an  absolute  worth  and  in 
reference  to which the being  of the world can have afinal purpose.  7 
Speculative  and  practical  reason  are  linked  in  that  their  ultimate 
ideal, their conception  of a rationally intelligible  world, is of a system of 
purposes  organized around free rational beings taken as the final purpose 
of  the  system,  a Kingdom  of  Ends.  But while  speculative  reason  hopes 
vainly to discover or prove that this ideal of reason is already realized in 
the world,  practical reason-or  morality-is  the attempt  to impose  this 
ideal on action and on the world insofar as action shapes  the world. We 
cannot  prove  that the  standards of reason  are met by the world as it is 
in itself and independently  of our own impositions.  But there  is no bar 
to our organizing  our own lives, our actions, and our characters so that 
they will accord with the standards of reason. Morality replaces metaphysics 
as the  highest  expression  of  our  rational  nature.  For Kant, this  makes 
the  good  will, rather than contemplative  activity, the source  of value. 
ARISTOTLE  AND  KANT  ON  THE  SOURCE  OF VALUE 
Aristotle  and  Kant agree  that there  are many things  that are worthy of 
choice  as ends  given  that one  is a human  being  with a certain  physical 
and psychological  constitution,  and with certain needs  and capacities for 
enjoyment  as a result. They  also agree  that these  are conditional  goods 
and  that  rationality  demands  more.  These  values  of  a human  life  are 
only really worth pursuing  if something  makes a human life worth living. 
Both  look for something  that human  beings  can do that gives a point  to 
being  human.  Both  believe  that  practical  reason  at  once  demands  a 
deeper justification  for human  existence  and teaches  us what will satisfy 
that demand.  Furthermore,  both are led to seek what is unconditionally 
good  in the  thought  of  what might  be a final purpose  for God,  whose 
choices and activities are not determined by any limiting condition. Aristotle 
thinks  that  God  contemplates,  while  Kant thinks  that  if  God  exists  he 
17.  Kant, Critique  ofJudgement, sec. 86, trans. J. H. Bernard  (New York: Hafner  Press, 
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must be conceived  as bringing  into being  the Highest  Good or Kingdom 
of Ends. 
The  similarities make the differences  more striking. Why exactly do 
the two philosophers  disagree? We have already seen why Aristotle puts 
the political life in second  place: moral actions are processes with results, 
and we gain apart from them; it is only because of this gain that it makes 
sense to devote  your life to them.  Indeed  the life of the statesperson  may 
in  some  respects  be  better  than  the  life  of  the  contemplator  but  only 
because  "though it is worth while to attain the end  merely  for one  man, 
it is finer  and  more  godlike  to  attain  it for  a nation  or  for  city-states" 
(1.2. 1094b, p. 2). Thus for Aristotle, morality is not the final good because 
it has  an  object  beyond  itself.  We might  be  tempted  to  oppose  to  this 
Kant's remarks, in the opening  of the Grundlegung, that the  good  will's 
goodness  is independent  of what it effects or accomplishes,  and his view 
that neither  the actual success or our efforts,  nor the purpose  for which 
we act, but only the grounds on which we choose our actions and purposes, 
matter  to  moral  worth.  But  Aristotle  denies  none  of  this.  His  virtuous 
person  does  virtuous  actions  for their own  sake and for the  sake of the 
noble,  and because they are directed by right reason.  It is also important 
that  Kant does  not  dismiss  considerations  of  what  is to be achieved  by 
morality as irrelevant. The  doctrine of practical religious faith is motivated 
by the  fact that the virtuous  person  needs  to believe  that the ends  that 
morality sets before her may be achieved through  her efforts. The  moral 
law  makes  the  highest  good  our  end  and  is threatened  if  the  highest 
good  is impossible  to attain. This  is not because  of  our  private  interest 
in our  own  happiness,  but because  the  motivating  thought  of  morality 
is the  thought  that autonomy  means  that one  can make a difference- 
one  is not just  part of the causal chain but may help  to bring about the 
highest  good.  Both  philosophers  believe  that a good  person  does  moral 
actions  for their own  sake-neither  thinks this means  it is unimportant 
whether  they achieve  the ends  they aim at. 
Kant has two kinds of argument  against the unconditional  value of 
contemplation.  One  is presented  in  the  quotation  from  the  Critique of 
Judgement given  above. The  world must have a final purpose  in order to 
be worth contemplating,  so contemplation  cannot be that final purpose. 
The reply that Aristotle could give might seem convoluted. We contemplate 
God;  yet  God  is  also  a  contemplator-and  what  God  contemplates  is 
God, for God is thinking on thinking. Thus to the charge that contemplation 
cannot  be the final purpose  because  the world needs  a final purpose  in 
order  to  be  worth  contemplating,  the  answer  would  be  both  that  the 
world has a final purpose  and is worth contemplating,  and that contem- 
plation  is that final purpose.  The  conception  may be alien to us, but the 
main idea is still clear: Aristotle thinks that we can participate in the final 
purpose  of the world through  contemplative  activity. 
And  contemplation  in this sense  is not strictly speaking  possible  on 
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and  a  participation  in  it  through  knowledge,  through  the  theoretical 
faculty.  But  for  Kant,  scientific  knowledge  associated  with  this  kind of 
understanding  does not exist; teleological  thinking is not knowledge,  and 
such grounding  as it has lies in practical religious  faith and so in ethics. 
We cannot,  through  theoretical  thinking,  participate in the final purpose 
of  the world.  We can only do this in practice. 
Kant's other argument  against contemplation  is found  in the Critique 
of Practical Reason. There,  Kant explicitly  says that the  pleasures  of  un- 
derstanding are on a footing with the physical pleasures: "For  the possibility 
of these  pleasures,  too, presupposes,  as the first condition  of our delight, 
the existence  in us of a corresponding  feeling" (pp. 24/23).  The  capacity 
to  enjoy  the  activities  of  understanding  is  as  much  the  result  of  our 
constitution  as  the  capacity  to  enjoy  physical  pleasures;  and  it  is  this 
capacity that makes both  possible  ends.  Neither  one,  as Kant conceives 
it, could  be assigned  to God.  Part of  the  problem  here  comes  from  an 
issue not taken up in this paper:  Kant associates pleasure  with passivity, 
with being  affected,  and this divorces it firmly both from autonomy  and 
from  divinity:  pleasure  goes  with being  susceptible  to causes.  Aristotle, 
by contrast,  associates  pleasure  with activity and  even  supposes  God  to 
be in a state of pleasure.'8  Plato and Aristotle  distinguish  between  pure 
or true pleasures,  the activities of  healthy  faculties  engaged  in for their 
own  sake and not provoked  by the "pain" of needs  and appetites;  while 
Kant says explicitly  that every  inclination  gives  rise to a need,  and  this 
is his ground  for saying  that "the value of any object obtainable  by our 
action  is always conditioned."  Yet Kant  and  Aristotle  agree  in  placing 
unconditional  value on activities that are unprovoked  by needs and there- 
fore done for their own sake unconditionally. This important characteristic 
is shared  by autonomously  chosen  actions  as conceived  by Kant as well 
as contemplation and the pleasures of perception as conceived by Aristotle. 
By  combining  these  two  objections  we  can  see  why  Kant  cannot 
agree with Aristotle about the unconditional  value of contemplation.  For 
Kant, reason's standards are our standards and we do not know whether 
the  world  as it is in itself  meets  them.  What we  know  is that it is only 
intelligible  to us if it does.  One  of  the  things  that this means  is that we 
cannot say that even contemplation is in Aristotle's sense a perfect activity. 
Like a physical pleasure, it satisfies a need of ours; this makes it a conditional 
end, and it may be nothing  more.  To reach the unconditioned  in a world 
where reason itself may be a purely human thing we must regard humanity 
as unconditionally  valuable.  Even if Kant fully accepted  the Aristotelian 
metaphysical  vision of a world striving for a kind of divine  activity as its 
final purpose,  it would retain for him the status of a human  creation,  its 
value arising from the way in which it meets human demands and standards. 
Even the activities that seem most perfect  to us, because we gain nothing 
18.  See  Metaphysics  Lambda 7.1072b  and Nicomachean  Ethics 7.14.1154b  for  the  view 
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apart from them  and are able to take them  as giving  point and meaning 
to our lives,  must actually get their value  from  our valuing  them. 
The  difference  between  Kant and Aristotle on this point has its roots 
not  directly  in ethics-anyway,  not  in a different  view of  practical rea- 
soning-but  in their stance toward metaphysics. Aristotle and Kant disagree 
not  so much  on  what it would  take to bring  value  into  the world as on 
what  is  available  for  the  purpose.  The  impossibility  of  a  teleological 
metaphysics  and the limitation  of theoretical  knowledge  to a mechanical 
account  places the good  squarely in the human  realm. The  good  cannot 
be contemplated  but only created by our efforts. What initially looks like 
a sort of moralism on Kant's part is really the consequence of his humanism. 
The  only  value  there  is is that which  human  beings  give  to  their  own 
lives. We must be the  source  of value. 